Tourism and Terrorism: A Historical Analysis of Major Terrorism Acts and Their Impact on Tourism Destinations by Pizam, Abraham & Smith, Ginger
University of Central Florida 
STARS 
Rosen Faculty Scholarship and Creative Works Rosen College of Hospitality Management 
2000 
Tourism and Terrorism: A Historical Analysis of Major Terrorism 
Acts and Their Impact on Tourism Destinations 
Abraham Pizam 
University of Central Florida, Abraham.Pizam@ucf.edu 
Ginger Smith 
 Part of the Hospitality Administration and Management Commons, and the Tourism and Travel 
Commons 
Find similar works at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/rosenscholar 
University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu 
This Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Rosen College of Hospitality Management at STARS. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Rosen Faculty Scholarship and Creative Works by an authorized administrator of 
STARS. For more information, please contact STARS@ucf.edu. 
Original Citation 
Abraham Pizam and Ginger Smith, “Tourism and Terrorism: A Historical Analysis of Major Terrorism Acts 
and Their Impact on Tourism Destinations” Tourism Economics, Vol. 6, No. 2, (2000), pp. 123-138. 
Tourism Economics, 2000, 6 (2), 123–138
Tourism and terrorism: a quantitative
analysis of major terrorist acts and their
impact on tourism destinations
A BRAHAM P IZAM
Department of Hospitality Management, University of Central Florida, PO Box 161400,
Orlando, FL 32816-1400, USA. Tel: + 1 407 823 6202.
Fax: +1 407 823 5696. E-mail: abraham.pizam@bus.ucf.edu
G INGER S MITH
The George Washington University, 600 21st Street, NW, Washington, DC 20052, USA.
Tel: +1 703 532 0085. Fax: +1 703 532 6516. E-mail: condado@juno.com
Since before the end of the Cold War, terrorism acts have had major
effects on tourism destinations. As a result, the ‘shadowy, mobile, and
unpredictable’ 1 forces of terrorism are becoming an unfortunate part
of the travel and tourism landscape. Few can forget the explosion that
killed three in Paris in 1986, the home-made pipe bomb in Tel Aviv
in 1990, the November 1997 massacre of 58 tourists at Luxor’s
Temple of Hatshepsut in Egypt, and the Kenyan and Tanzanian US
Embassy truck bombings killing 263 in August 1998. This paper
provides a quantitative analysis of major terrorism events around the
world during 1985–98, classified by date, location, victims, weapons
used, severity of damage, motive, effect on tourism demand, and
length of effect. The analysis is followed by a summary and conclu-
sions about the magnitude of the impact of these events on host
destinations and the tourism industry worldwide.
Terrorism is a systematic and persistent strategy practiced by a state or political group
against another state, political or social group through a campaign of acts of violence,
such as assassinations, hijacking, use of explosives, sabotage, murder and the like, with
the intent of creating a state of terror and public intimidation to achieve political,
social or religious ends.2
In Egypt it has been called ‘a passing shadow’;3 in Northern Ireland, ‘The
Troubles’.4 Increasingly, however, terrorism is known coldly by its own name
and sits in the harsh light of day on the crisis planning and risk management
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agenda of tourism destinations worldwide. Government, industry, and the trav-
elling public clearly understand that terrorist acts occurring at tourism desti-
nations have a negative impact on tourism demand – and collectively view
certain terrorist acts as more brutal or heinous than others. What have not been
clear to date, however, are the specific temporal effects on tourism demand of
terrorism acts that have occurred at tourism destinations and whether certain
types of acts of terrorism had a more severe effect on tourism demand than
others.
The research discussed here analyses these effects using the Lexis/Nexis
Academic Universe database and a review of all newspaper and magazine articles
discussing the topics of ‘tourism and terrorism’ for the period 1985–98. Before
turning to an analysis of findings from these data, however, we offer a review
of scholarly literature illuminating tourism and terrorism issues and develop-
ments in the 1980s and 1990s. This review focuses, where possible, on the
identification of different types of terrorist acts and the length of the effect on
demand in tourism destinations.
The terrorism and tourism landscape: 1980s and 1990s
Links between terrorism and tourism
Terrorism increased throughout the 1970s and 1980s to such a degree that it
justified Richter and Waugh Jr’s5 statement that ‘terrorism against tourists has
moved from the political periphery of the globe to the very centers of power
and international trade’. Terrorism increased from 206 major events in 1972 to
3,010 in 1985.6 The literature illustrates in many forms the costs of terrorism
as manifested in steep declines in tourism receipts and demand, such as the loss
of over a million arrivals from the USA to Europe in 1986 – down 23% from
1985 – as an aftermath of the December 1985 Palestinian terrorists’ attacks in
airports in Rome and Vienna and the 1986 hijacking of TWA flight 847 in
Athens and seizure of the cruise ship Achille Lauro.7
Though the frequency of terrorist acts had subsided by the mid-1990s, the
‘legacy of terrorism’8 is still very much in evidence today, transferring political
conflict between terrorists and the establishment to a wider scale.9
Ryan raised an important question when he asked whether there was ‘some-
thing inherent in the tourist location that creates special opportunities’ linking
organized terrorist attacks against tourists to tourism itself.10 He disputed the
existence of a direct relationship, with examples from Corsica and Wales that
showed that additional factors, such as strong national feelings, must also be
present. Therefore, the relationship is, at minimum, quite complex. Pizam11 and
Milman and Pizam12 suggested that local people perceived a link between
tourism and crime. Aziz claims that terrorist violence, at least in Egypt, is in
fact a reaction to demonstrably irresponsible tourism development13 – develop-
ment that uses public funds for tourism-related infrastructure in ‘luxury ghettos’
while basic requirements in water, sewage, power, telecommunications, and
community facilities in other areas go unmet. Aziz also articulates the manner
in which tourism in principle violates cultural values and traditions inherent
in the comprehensive rules and codes governing Islamic daily life and its concept
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of travel and relations between hosts and guests.14 He attributes the acts of
violence carried out by Muslim activists in Egypt to ‘reaction to the govern-
ment’s programme of attacks, capture, and actual imprisonment directed against
these groups’.15
Effect of political violence and terrorism on tourism demand
As terrorism and political violence secured their positions as contemporary issues
in international affairs, their economic impact on demand in tourist destinations
became increasingly apparent. The Persian Gulf War in 1991 suspended travel.
While the number of international terrorist incidents had ‘dropped by 1992 to
361 . . . exposure to media coverage of incidents may have unintentionally
frightened and discouraged the public from international travel by magnifying
the already volatile relationship between terrorism and tourism and clouding
actual probabilities of travelers being targeted by a terrorist act’.16 Fear and
insecurity about the possibilities of terrorism affect tourism demand, even when,
in fact, deaths and injuries from terrorism for US citizens are statistically
insignificant – less likely to occur than being struck by lightning or killed in
an accident on the roads or at home.17
At the same time, however, terrorism has gained premier power and efficiency
as a political weapon through mass media coverage and the exaggerated per-
ceptions about traveller safety and security that this perpetuates.18 Ryan called
the ‘news value’ of an attack the notoriety which terrorist groups attained in
search of publicity for their views and confirmation of their own importance.19
This has resulted in difficult tourism patterns in Northern Ireland, where return
of demand to pre-incident levels following ‘The Troubles’ has required up to
three years.20 As Richter and Waugh Jr22 suggest, ‘over-reaction [of tourism
destination managers and of the travelling public] increases the impact and
importance of terrorist events’.
In researching the effects of terrorism on international business traveller
behaviour, Sonmez22 noted that 83% of travellers reported that they had changed
to more ‘secure’ behaviour to keep themselves safe (for example, ‘keeping low-
profile, dressing down, eliminating conspicuous consumption, not identifying
oneself with a large corporation’), and ‘nearly all experienced restricted freedoms,
increased inconvenience, and heightened anxiety’.23 Sonmez also summarized
various studies examining the impacts of terrorism on tourism destinations from
an economic perspective.24 Of particular interest is Enders and Sandler’s find-
ing25 ‘that a typical international terrorist incident in Spain causes tourist
arrivals to drop by over 140,000, and that tourism to Spain begins to decline
three months after [authors’ emphasis] a typical terrorist event’.26 Furthermore, in
their study of European countries dependent on tourism for foreign exchange,
Enders et al 27 report ‘that tourism reacts to terrorist occurrences after six to nine
months have passed [again, authors’ emphasis]’.28 These findings point to the
possibility of delayed temporal effects of terrorist acts on tourism demand.
By the late 1990s, heightened security and baggage searches were routines
of travel, and the potential of what Wall calls ‘extreme events’ to affect single
destinations as well as entire regions became very real. These included a political
analyst’s forecast of potential electoral violence in Jamaica that, although it was
to prove erroneous, damaged the entire Jamaican tourism industry. Political
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instability and violence in Zimbabwe adversely affected the region, including
the Zambian tourism industry. Wall noted that, while tourists were not directly
targeted in most terrorism cases, areas where tourism occurred were frequented
by tourists, with the result that local citizens, tourists, and the tourism industry
were all directly affected.29 This produced short- and long-term effects on
tourism demand, from cancellation of bookings and reduction in new bookings
to reductions in global travel, as during the Persian Gulf War.30
Tourism demand and tourist country of origin
Tourist country of origin has emerged as an important determining factor in
understanding the impact of terrorist acts on tourism demand in affected
destinations. Tremblay31 offers insight into the relationship between terrorist
acts and tourism demand in his examination of tourism receipts of 18 European
countries. As described by Sonmez,32 Tremblay’s findings indicate that terrorism
did not have as significant an impact on receipts from European tourists as it
did on tourists from North America. This he attributed to differing levels of
access between Europeans and North Americans to information about political
events in Europe and to exposure to intense media coverage. Additionally,
despite the low statistical level of risk, North Americans tend to perceive
themselves as more highly selected for terrorist acts than other nationalities and,
as a consequence, their personal safety is threatened by what Wall33 calls ‘the
legacy of terrorism’. As Richter34 determined to be the case in the Philippines,
political instability or terrorism, even in nearby regions, supersedes scenic or
cultural attractions in importance for tourism demand. Sonmez sets a valid
prescription for future research on the implications of terrorism’s impact on
tourism destinations when she recommends that ‘travel risk should be studied
in terms of real and perceived risk and in relation to destination image and
traveler attitudes’.35
Destination image and the mass media
Competitive factors, such as the attractiveness of tourism product development,
diversification, and pricing, appear to affect the resilience of tourism destina-
tions in the face of terrorists acts occurring in their location or region. Wall
suggests that, while tourists may resume normal travel habits in a matter of
weeks after a single terrorist event, investors may take longer to return, if they
ever do, to what they may consider unreliable business climates.36 Wahab37
discussed the effect of terrorism on tourism demand in Egypt, and showed that,
while destinations such as the USA, France, and the UK experienced short-term
decreases in inbound travel in response to terrorist acts, ‘in Egypt, terrorism’s
effect on tourism demand was quite marked’.38 He attributed this effect to
Egypt’s development of an adverse image due to sustained terrorism and related
negative media coverage.
The growth in tourism demand in Northern Ireland between 31 August
1994 and 9 February 1996, during the 18-month terrorist cease-fire, provides
a dramatic demonstration of the resilience of demand. Inquiries rose by 49%
in 1994, room occupancy during 1995 increased by 11% percent over 1994,
out-of-state visitors rose by 18% and holiday visitors by 68%. Figures for the
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whole of 1995 show a total visitor increase of 17% over 1994.39 Leslie claims,
however, that declining visitor levels in 1996 indicate that this surge in visitor
numbers, often termed ‘the peace dividend’, may be short-lived. He proposed
that ‘The Troubles’, which have been exacerbated by media attention and
sensationalism, have been only part of the cause of Northern Ireland’s low level
of tourism demand and have, in fact, served as a ‘convenient veil’ masking more
significant and far-reaching socio-economic trends.40 He outlined these trends
as, among other things, lack of tourism product development and diversifica-
tion, lower income levels, and higher cost of living, arguing that they had
resulted in Northern Ireland’s designation as a ‘less favoured region’ by the
European Union.41 Dramatic expansion in the supply and diversity of lower-
priced international package holidays had increased competition and reduced
demand for the now more expensive traditional vacation – a week for a family
of four in the Irish countryside.42
Terrorism and destination crisis management
With nearly two decades of research now available on the effect of terrorism on
the demand for tourism, the question now arises, ‘Are peace and geopolitical
stability the only prerequisites for ensuring long-term success of previously
disrupted tourism industries?’.43 Mansfeld44 and Sonmez, Apostolopoulos, and
Tarlow45 advocate that carefully planned and implemented crisis management
policies and crisis management strategies must form the basis of overall sus-
tainable development master-planning for tourism destinations. For destinations
that have been harmed in the past by recurrent terrorist actions, this will require
‘marketing/management strategies to protect and rebuild their image of safety
and attractiveness’.46 In the case of Israel, Egypt, the Republic of Cyprus,
Turkey, Albania, Jordan, and Mozambique, Mansfeld suggested that the short
recovery periods following terrorist acts could be explained by the growing
market demand for highly attractive and new, ‘unexplored’ destinations. The
pressure of this demand replaced the destination image in the public’s eye from
insecure to secure once the situation had calmed down.47
This image change, however, is possible only in the context of random acts.
Persistent acts of terrorism can ‘tarnish a destination’s image of safety and
attractiveness and jeopardize its entire tourism industry’.48 This happens because
increasingly higher forms of communication and information technologies are
assisting the media in their graphically detailed and instantaneous reporting on
terrorist activities ‘live’ from anywhere in the world. Sonmez recognizes the
importance of mass media in affecting a destination’s image and the need for
further research examining the link between the two.49
Mansfeld described the impact of terrorist events on a given destination as
both ‘unpredictable and highly differential’, with the dynamics and outcomes
possibly changing over time.50 He recommended the formulation of crisis
management guidelines and courses of action to help control destination image.
He used the case of Israel to show that despite numerous cycles of disruption
and war, the Israeli government had delayed building an organized crisis man-
agement and contingency plan. Mansfeld’s recommendation to destinations that
have to cope with cycles of violence and tourism is to view crisis management
as a long-term process built on:51
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 monitoring of past and current trends as a travel destination;
 cooperation and integration of all operations;
 representation of all parties involved;
 access to comprehensive information exchange at the level of security and
safety; and
 proper budgeting.
Terrorist risks to tourism multinational corporations and their related activities
in less-developed tourism destinations has also begun to be addressed in the
broader political science context of political risk analysis. As the political nature
of tourism became increasingly well-known, Poirier stated that ‘factors which
produce instability in one society may not be relevant to other political sys-
tems’.52 Furthermore, political stability in and of itself is not a sufficient
guarantee of the success of a tourism destination without favourable economic
conditions.53 Poirier54 pointed to potential challenges and risks for tourism
operations in relation to a new international economic order (NIEO). NIEO
involves the changing of global economic and legal principles that support the
traditional North–South flows of products and services and altering the behav-
iour of multinational enterprises to promote the economic and social progress
of developing and less-developed countries. Terrorism can be a powerful instru-
ment in forging this change.
Fortunately, tourism destinations experiencing terrorist acts may learn lessons
from the past, including the need to be prepared with a crisis management
taskforce, guidebook, and pre-established partnerships among tourism organi-
zations and local law enforcement agencies and officials.55
Equipped with an understanding of the above terrorism and tourism land-
scape, this article now turns to a quantitative analysis of terrorism acts that
occurred between 1985 and 1998 and assesses their impact on tourism desti-
nations.
Terrorist acts between 1985 and 1998 and their impact on tourism
Objectives and methodology
The study objectives were:
 To analyse the effects of acts of terrorism occurring at tourism destinations
on tourism demand.
 To determine whether certain acts of terrorism had a more severe effect on
tourism demand than others.
Using the Lexis/Nexis Academic Universe database, a review was undertaken
of all newspapers and magazine articles discussing the topics of ‘tourism and
terrorism’ for the period 1985–98. The main publication sources identified in
the search were: The Economist, the Financial Times, The Herald (Glasgow), the
Los Angeles Times, the New York Times, The Times (UK), Time, and the Washington
Post.
The search identified a total of 70 major incidents that occurred in 28
countries, as shown in Table 1.
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Table 1. Number of terrorist incidents per year, 1985–98.
Year Number of terrorist incidents
1985 6
1986 4
1987 5
1988 4
1989 1
1990 3
1991 1
1992 4
1993 9
1994 11
1995 3
1996 1
1997 2
1998 8
Total incidences 70
Analysis
1. Matrix. The data collected were inserted into a matrix (see Table 2) that
included the following information:
 Date of event
 Location (city, state, country)
 Description (short summary)
 Victims’ identity (Tourists/Residents/Tourists and residents/Public officials)
 Severity of act (Property loss/Bodily harm/Loss of life/Mass destruction)
 Number of people injured
 Motive (Independence/Social injustice)
 Effect on tourism demand (No effect/Slight decline/Significant decline/Ces-
sation)
 Length of effect (Less than 1 month/1–3 months/4–6 months/7–12 months/
More than 12 months)
 Location of terrorist act (Urban area/Rural area/Mode of transportation)
 Terrorism weapons used (Bomb/Gun/Hijack/Kidnap/Execution/Rape/Knife/
Sword)
Table 2 comprises a sample page from the complete matrix constructed to
illustrate the data collected on terrorist acts and their effect on tourism des-
tinations.
2. Frequency distribution of terrorist acts and their effect on tourism destinations. Tables
3–11 illustrate the frequency distribution calculated according to the following
variables:
 countries affected by terrorist acts and frequency of acts;
 identity of victims;
 severity of damage inflicted;
 number of injured/killed;
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Table 2. Sample page from research matrix (continues on facing page).
Date  Location            Identity of victims
  of (city, state, Description (short summary of event       (place ‘X’ in appropriate
event  country)     including identity of terrorists)                   column)
Tour-
 ists Pub-
 and  lic
Tour- Resi-  resi- offic-
 ists dents dents  ials
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    Length of effect
No.    Motive    (months)
Severity of damage of (place ‘X’ in          Effect on tourism  (place ‘X’ in
(place ‘X’ in inju-  appropriate               (place ‘X’ in   appropriate
appropriate column) red    column)        appropriate column)           column)
Mass
Bodily dest.  Dra-
Prop-  harm Loss of Inde- Social Slight Sig.  stic Ces-
 erty  (phys.  of life + pend- injus-  dec- dec-  dec- sat- 1– 4–  7–
 loss injury) life prop.  ence  tice None  line line  line ion <1 3 6  12 >12
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 motive for the terrorist act;
 location of the terrorist act;
 instrument of terrorism;
 effect on tourism demand; and
 length of effect.
As can be seen from the tables:
(1) The majority (54%) of terrorist events occurred in the Middle East, fol-
lowed by Europe (27%) and Asia (12%).
(2) In an absolute majority of the incidents (71%) tourists were among the
victims of terrorist acts.
(3) In three-quarters of the cases the acts caused bodily harm or loss of life.
(4) The average number of people who died or suffered injuries in an event
was 37.
(5) The motives for terrorist acts were equally split between ‘independence’ and
‘social injustice’.
(6) Many (44%) of the events occurred in an urban location, followed by a
mode of transportation (32%), and rural location (23%).
(7) Guns were used in many (45%) of the terrorist acts.
(8) In three-quarters of the cases the acts caused a decline in tourism demand.
(9) The median length of the decline in demand was 1–3 months, with more
than one-third of the cases causing a decline of 4–6 months.
3. The relationship between terrorism characteristics and tourism demand. This
research identified the following statistically significant relationships between
terrorism characteristics and tourism demand:
(1) Acts of terrorism motivated by ‘social injustice’ had a stronger negative
effect on tourism demand than those motivated by ‘independence’.
(2) Acts of terrorism that victimized both tourists and residents had a stronger
impact on tourism demand than those that victimized residents only.
(3) Acts of terrorism that resulted in bodily harm had a longer negative effect
on tourism demand than acts that resulted in property loss.
(4) Acts of terrorism committed with guns had a more negative and longer
lasting effect on tourism demand than those committed with bombs.
(5) No statistically significant differences were found between the location of
the terrorist act and the effect on tourism demand.
Conclusions
Based on the results of the above study it is obvious that terrorist acts occurring
at tourist destinations have been numerous and frequent. In the fourteen-year
period covered by the study, we identified a total of 70 acts, an average of 5
acts per year. Though the majority of these acts occurred in the Middle East,
terrorism also afflicted countries in Europe, Asia, and the Americas. The ter-
rorism acts identified in this study have not only caused substantial destruction
of private and public property, but more importantly have resulted in the death
of 830 men and women and caused injuries to 1,465 people, a majority of whom
were innocent tourists. This translates into an average of 37 injured or dead per
continued on page 136
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Table 3. Countries in which terrorist events occurred.
Country Frequency %
Egypt 19 27.1
Israel 7 10.0
Turkey 7 10.0
France 4 5.7
UK 5 7.1
Greece 3 4.3
Spain 3 4.3
Lebanon 2 2.9
Bahamas 1 1.4
Italy 1 1.4
Mediterranean Sea 1 1.4
Philippines 1 1.4
USSR 1 1.4
Thailand 1 1.4
Iran 1 1.4
Cyprus 1 1.4
Colombia 1 1.4
Cambodia 1 1.4
USA 1 1.4
Germany 1 1.4
Sweden 1 1.4
Denmark 1 1.4
Switzerland 1 1.4
Peru 1 1.4
Algeria 1 1.4
Kenya 1 1.4
Tanzania 1 1.4
Yemen 1 1.4
Total incidents 70 100.0
Total countries 28a
Top 8 countries 71.4
aSome incidents affected more than one country.
Table 4. Identity of victims.
Identity  Number of cases %
Tourists 15 22.7
Residents 13 19.7
Tourists and residents 32 48.5
Public officials 6 9.1
Totala 66 100
aMultiple responses
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Table 5. Severity of damage.
Damage Number of cases %
Property loss 25 24.3
Bodily harm 42 40.8
Loss of life 33 32.0
Mass destruction of life and property 3  2.9
Totala 103 100.0
aMultiple responses
Table 6. Number of injuries.
Number %
Death 830 36.2
Injury 1,465 63.8
Total 2,295 100
Average per incident 37
Table 7. Motive for terrorist act.
Motive Number of cases % valid %
Independence 26 49.1 42.0
Social injustice 27 50.9 43.5
Total 53 100
Table 8. Location of terrorist act.
Location Number of cases %
Urban 34 44.2
Rural 18 23.4
Transport 25 32.5
Totala 77 100.0
aMultiple responses
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Table 9. Instruments of terrorism.
Instrument Number of cases %
Guns 34 45.3
Bomb 29 38.7
Highjacking 7 9.3
Kidnapping 2 2.7
Execution 3 4.0
Rape 0 0.0
Knives/swords 0 0.0
Totala 75 100
aMultiple responses
Table 10. Effect of terrorist act on tourism demand.
Effect Number of cases %
No effect 8 12.9
Slight decline 28 45.2
Significant decline 19 30.6
Drastic decline 7 11.3
Cessation 0  0.0
Total 62 100
Table 11. Length of effect on tourism demand.
Length Number of cases % valid %
Less than 1 month 12 22.6 19.3
1–3 months 19 35.9 30.7
4–6 months 18 33.9 29.0
7–12 months 2 3.8 3.2
More than 12 months 2 3.8 3.2
Total 53 100
Unknown 9 14.6
Grand Total 62 100
Median = 1–3 months
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incident. With tourists representing 71% of those victimized by terrorist acts,
it comes as no surprise that tourism destinations have been singled out by
terrorists as targets. As a consequence, the tourism industry at large must come
together to combat the perceived and actual threats that this trend presents to
its vast customer base – the travelling public.
As expected, those acts that resulted in bodily harm or death, especially those
committed with guns, had a longer negative effect on tourism demand than
those that resulted only in property loss. The acts were conducted in various
locations, including urban centres, rural areas, and on buses, ships, and aircraft.
The motives of the terrorists who conducted these acts were equally divided
between a ‘quest for independence’ and ‘perceived social injustice’. However, the
statistical analysis found that those who were motivated by ‘perceived social
injustice’ had a stronger negative impact on tourism demand that those mo-
tivated by a ‘quest for independence’.
Regarding the effects of these acts on tourism demand, the study found that
a large portion of them (79%) caused a significant decline in tourism demand
that lasted from one to six months, with recovery in approximately 50% of the
cases within three months or less. The delayed effects of a decline in tourist
demand, occurring as much as six months after the terrorists acts, as described
in the literature, may possibly have been captured in the approximately 6% of
cases indicated in the study as having 7–12 or more than 12 months’ effect on
tourism demand. Another possible explanation for a delayed decline in tourism
demand may be that travel arrangements cancelled at the last minute, no matter
what the cause – an unanticipated illness or a terrorist act – are generally
prepaid and often non-refundable. These revenues may in reality be forfeited
rather than spent on actual travel by the traveller, who instead may have elected
to cancel travel arrangements at the last minute to a destination recently struck
by terrorists. This hypothesis suggests that a certain proportion of tourist
revenues may be left in the destination economy in the first few months
following a terrorist act. The effect of this may be to conceal immediate declines
in tourism demand during the first few months through false readings of
artificially inflated tourism receipts for this period. After three months, this
‘cancellation effect’ would most likely have dissipated, and the full economic
effect of the decline in demand would be felt.
The sad fact is that terrorism and tourism appear to have become inextricably
linked. Accepting the permanence of this relationship can help us design
research that will enable us to understand and mitigate terrorism’s effects on
tourism demand and the economic and socio-cultural quality of life in tourism
destinations. The tourism industry seems to be relatively resilient, and, in most
cases, destinations in the study demonstrated an ability to recover from the
devastating effects of terrorism. Fortunately, despite the advent and growth of
terrorism, tourism has continued to flourish. If terrorist acts are not repeated
at close intervals, tourists will come back again and the destination will recover.
People will continue to want to travel, and they appear to be willing to consider
a place secure again following a terrorist act if proper marketing/image and crisis
management occurs or, depending on the nature of the act, simply if sufficient
time passes without further incident.
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Study limitations and future research
The fact that our study is based on newspaper and wire reports may make it
susceptible to personal interpretation and political or social biases held by
reporters and editors. Therefore, its sources cannot be considered to be 100%
reliable and accurate. In addition, some of the compiled data, such as the
magnitude and duration of the effects on tourism demand were estimated by the
authors on the basis of these newspaper reports. Thus, once again, these data
cannot be considered as totally objective and accurate.
Regarding future research directions, the study suggests that one of the
factors that may be responsible for the differential rate of recovery from terror-
ism acts is the composition of the tourists. It is possible that the residents of
some tourism generating countries are quicker to return to a destination that
has been afflicted by terrorism acts than those of others. Thus in future studies
of the effects of terrorism acts on tourism demand, it would be desirable to
incorporate the variable of tourist country of origin into the research design.
Last but not least, it is recommended that future researchers study the
delayed effect of terrorist acts on demand in tourism destinations, since numer-
ous tourism experts have hypothesized that the effects of terrorist acts may
surface only weeks or months after the events themselves.
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